

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1467

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0079

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ANALYSIS OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL

FOL IS DELEGATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL

ADVANCED ON FEB 7:

1. BASIC ELEMENTS NOT NEW: THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL ARE NOT NEW. THE BASIC STRUCTURE IS THE ORIGINAL THREE-STAGE PLAN WITH THE ADDITION OF THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED FREEZE AT THE END OF THE FIRST STAGE. THE PROPOSAL IS STILL BASED ON THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH OF PRESERVING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES THROUGH THE USE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE

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AND EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS.

2. DEPARTURES FROM PREVIOUS CONCEPT: THE FOL ELEMENTS ARE NEW OR REPRESENT DEPARTURES FROM THE PREVIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS:

A. THE FIRST STAGE PROVIDES FOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS ONLY. THE PREVIOUS EASTERN FIRST STAGE PROPOSAL (INITIAL REDUCTION STEP) PROVIDED THAT HALF OF THE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND THE OTHER HALF FORCES OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

B. THE EAST HAS SHIFTED FROM EQUAL ABSOLUTE NUMBERS TO AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE FORMULA FOR CALCULATING MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN STAGE ONE.

C. BECAUSE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED THE WEST THE OPTION TO SELECT EITHER 2 PERCENT OR 3 PERCENT OF TOTAL FORCES ON EACH SIDE AS BASIS FOR AMOUNT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN IN STAGE ONE, THIS IMPLIES AS MANY AS 29,000 US AND 34,000 SOVIETS (BASED ON WESTERN DATA) IN THE FIRST STAGE. THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL OF 1974 PROVIDED FOR 10,000 US AND 10,000 SOVIETS.

D. THE EAST HAS NOW MADE A PROPOSAL FOR SPECIFIC ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN STAGE ONE WITH RESPECT TO NUMBER AND TYPE.

E. THE FREEZE ON MANPOWER OF REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ACCOMPANIES, RATHER THAN PRECEDES, STAGE ONE REDUCTIONS.

F. WITHDRAWN FORCES ARE TO BE DISBANDED (THOUGH NOT DEMOBILIZED).

3. UNCLEAR ELEMENTS: A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS ARE UNCLEAR.

THEY INCLUDE:

A. WHETHER THE ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED AND LIMITED IN STAGE ONE ARE ONLY THE SELECTED MAJOR ARMAMENTS, RATHER THAN ALL THE EQUIPMENT OF THE WITHDRAWN UNITS AS WELL.

B. WHAT FORCE ELEMENTS WOULD BE LIMITED AFTER THE REDUCTIONS; E.G., SELECTED ARMAMENTS ONLY OR ALL ARMAMENTS; UNITS, INCLUDING CORPS HEADQUARTERS, AND WHETHER NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS ARE
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ENVISAGED.

C. THE REASON FOR DIVERGENCE IN REDUCTION METHODS PROPOSED: MANPOWER REDUCTION IS TO BE BY PERCENTAGE, ARMAMENTS BY ABSOLUTE NUMBERS. THE REASON FOR THIS DIVERGENT TREATMENT IS NOT FULLY APPARENT. IT MAY BE UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE DATA ON CURRENT ARMAMENT LEVELS.

D. WHY NO SPECIFIC FIGURES ARE GIVEN FOR PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF WARHEADS AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS. THIS COULD INDICATE EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO MATCH IN NUMBER THE WARHEAD REDUCTIONS OFFERED BY THE WEST OR POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY AS TO THE AMOUNT OF ARMS REDUCTIONS.

E. WHILE SOME ARMAMENTS PROPOSED FOR REDUCTION ARE CLEARLY MAJOR, THE INCLUSION OF AIR DEFENSE MISSILES IS NOT SELF-EXPLANATORY. IT MAY BE THAT THEIR ADDITION IS MERELY TO PAD OUT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO MAKE IT APPEAR MORE ATTRACTIVE AND THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL IS ALREADY PROGRAMMED.

F. WHY STAGE-ONE IS FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INCREASE EASTERN VULNERABILITY TO PRESSURE FOR EXCHANGE OF DATA. FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS AS IN PREVIOUS VERSIONS.

G. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW PROPOSAL, THE CONCURRENT CONTINUED EASTERN STRESS ON THE FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE, INCLUDING THE NEED TO REALLOCATE DISPUTED FORCE TYPES, IS A PUZZLING ELEMENT IN THE OVERALL EASTERN POSITION. AGREEMENT ON INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A BASE FIGURE TO BE USED IN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION. BUT AGREEMENT TO DIVIDE ALL FORCES INTO GROUND AND AIR IS NOT NECESSARY TO THIS CONCEPT. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR WHY REALLOCATION SHOULD BE AN OBJECT OF SUCH INTEREST. IT, TOO, IS NOT NEEDED TO CALCULATE TOTAL REDUCTIONS.

H. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LAST POINT, THE LISTED AMBIGUITIES SEEM INTENTIONAL. THEIR MOTIVATION MAY BE TACTICAL ON SOME ISSUES, OR THEY MAY INDICATE SOME FLEXIBILITY OR REPRESENT GENUINE INDECISION.

4. CONSEQUENCES IF PROPOSAL ACCEPTED: IF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL
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WERE ACCEPTED IT WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WEST:

A. THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT ASYMMETRY IN MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND THE DISPARITY IN MANPOWER WOULD BE CONTRACTUALIZED.

B. THERE WOULD BE NO COMMON CEILING.

C. THE WEST WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER.

D. THE US WOULD BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW AND LIMIT US TANKS AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

E. ACCEPTANCE WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, FOR THE NON-US

WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

F. IT WOULD FREEZE THE DISPARITY IN ARMAMENTS.

G. IT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN STAGE TWO.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

H. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL APPARENTLY DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR REAL PHASING; INSTEAD, IT WOULD REQUIRE A REDUCTION COMMITMENT IN STAGE ONE FROM EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT TO REDUCE, SPECIFYING SCOPE AND TIMING.

I. IT WOULD REQUIRE DISBANDING OF WITHDRAWN U.S., CANADIAN AND UK UNITS AS WELL AS SOVIET UNITS. UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS, WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO ABIDE BY SUCH A COMMITMENT,

BUT IT WOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE AS FAR AS THE USSR IS CONCERNED.

5. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT: OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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A. NO FINAL ASSESSMENT IS POSSIBLE UNTIL FULL DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE.

B. BASED ON WHAT IS PRESENTLY KNOWN ABOUT IT, THE PROPOSAL IS INTRINSICALLY UNACCEPTABLE. EVEN IF IT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., A MOVE BY U.S. FOR ACCEPTANCE WOULD BRING MAJOR CONFLICT WITH THE ALLIES.

C. THE PROPOSAL CONTAINS SOME INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WHICH IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THESE ELEMENTS INCLUDE: (1) POSSIBLE LEAD-IN TO DATA EXCHANGE; (2) EXCLUSIVELY U.S. AND SOVIET FIRST REDUCTIONS; (3) NARROWER FOCUS ON ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS; AND (4) POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY AS REGARDS COMPOSITION AND AMOUNT OF ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS FOR EACH SIDE.

D. IT IS DOUBTFUL, FOR REASONS INDICATED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, THAT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED BY ITS AUTHORS AS A FINAL POSITION. RATHER, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED, FIRST, TO COUNTER ANY PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE THE WEST MAY HAVE GAINED FROM THE OPTION 3 PROPOSAL, AND SECOND, AS A TIME-FILLER, TO HOLD THE GROUND WHILE FURTHER ACTION IS CONSIDERED FOR A LATER TIME.

6. SUGGESTED PRELIMINARY TREATMENT: WE SUGGEST THAT, ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS, THE ALLIES SHOULD:

A. CONTINUE TO PUSH HARD FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN POSITION, EMPHASIZING THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRY AND FOR USE OF THE MIXED-PACKAGE CONCEPT.

B. PUSH HARD FOR DATA EXCHANGE ON MANPOWER, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DEMONSTRATING THE DISPARITY AND DOCUMENTING THE WESTERN CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

C. TREAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY AND POLITELY.

D. AVOID OFF-HAND IMMEDIATE REJECTION (THIS WOULD PROBABLY PROVOKE FORMAL EASTERN REJECTION OF THE WESTERN DEC 16 PROPOSAL).

E. PROBE FOR DETAILS ON UNCLEAR ASPECTS.

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F. SEEK TO DEFINE AREAS OF RELATIVE FLEXIBILITY AND HARDNESS.

G. DEMONSTRATE TO THE EAST THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL, AND CHALLENGE THE EAST TO DEMONSTRATE IN WHAT RESPECTS THEY BELIEVE THEIR PROPOSAL MEETS WESTERN POSITIONS OR DEPARTS FROM EARLIER EASTERN POSITIONS.

H. COUNTER, AS NECESSARY, EASTERN PUBLIC CLAIMS THAT THIS NEW PROPOSAL MEETS IMPORTANT WESTERN INTERESTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD STRESS THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE DISPARITIES. THEY SHOULD UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN DEC 16 PROPOSALS, AS PROVIDING A REASONABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

7. GENERAL COMMENT: THE FACT THAT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS FORMULATED IN A WAY WHICH REQUIRES NOT ONLY DATA EXCHANGE BUT ACTUAL AGREEMENT ON FORCE TOTALS, PLUS CONTINUED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON RE-ALLOCATION OF DISPUTED FORCE TYPES, SUGGESTS THAT SOVIETS MAY BE MOVING CLOSER TO AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE DATA AND OPENS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO DO SO WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON A FORCE REDUCTION APPROACH.

8. IF THE EAST DID AGREE TO DATA EXCHANGE, IT WOULD NOT BE TO ITS ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE TO PUT DOWN FIGURES SO DISTORTED THAT THE WEST COULD EASILY DEMONSTRATE THEIR FALSITY. HENCE, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT, IF THE EAST DOES IN FACT TABLE FIGURES, THESE WOULD DOCUMENT THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY.

9. CONFIRMATION BY THE EAST ITSELF OF THE EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES WOULD STRENGTHEN BOTH THE COGENCY OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH AND THE RATIONALE FOR WESTERN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE EASTERN APPROACH. THE EAST IS CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS. (POLISH REPS HAVE SEVERAL TIMES STATED THAT A MAIN REASON FOR EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO TABLE DATA WAS THAT DOING SO WOULD CONFIRM THE WESTERN CASE ON DISPARITIES). THEREFORE, EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DATA EXCHANGE, IF IT DOES IN FACT EVENTUATE, SHOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE CONSIDERED AN INDICATION THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED TO SERIOUSLY NEGOTIATE ABOUT DISPARITIES.

10. THESE ARE THE REASONS WHY WE THINK IT WORTHWHILE FOR THE WEST TO MAKE NO CHANGES IN ITS POSITION, TO CONTINUE TO PUSH
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FOR THE WESTERN DEC 16 PROPOSAL, EMPHASIZING THE CASE FOR PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND TO INTENSIFY PRESSURE FOR DATA EXCHANGE. RESOR

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